Evaluating Macroeconomic Forecasts: A Concise Review of Some Recent Developments by Franses, P. H. et al.
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
 
CHRISTCHURCH, NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
 
Evaluating Macroeconomic Forecasts: 
A Concise Review of Some Recent Developments 
 
 
Philip Hans Franses 
Michael McAleer 
Rianne Legerstee 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
 
 
No. 12/2012 
 
 
 
Department of Economics and Finance 
College of Business and Economics 
University of Canterbury 
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 
  New Zealand 
WORKING PAPER No. 12/2012  
Evaluating Macroeconomic Forecasts: 
A Concise Review of Some Recent Developments 
Philip Hans Franses
1
, Michael McAleer
2
, Rianne Legerstee
3   
8 June 2012 
 
Abstract: Macroeconomic forecasts are frequently produced, widely published, intensively 
discussed and comprehensively used. The formal evaluation of such forecasts has a long 
research history. Recently, a new angle to the evaluation of forecasts has been addressed, and 
in this review we analyse some recent developments from that perspective. The literature on 
forecast evaluation predominantly assumes that macroeconomic forecasts are generated from 
econometric models. In practice, however, most macroeconomic forecasts, such as those 
from the IMF, World Bank, OECD, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) and the ECB, are typically based on econometric model forecasts jointly with 
human intuition. This seemingly inevitable combination renders most of these forecasts 
biased and, as such, their evaluation becomes non-standard. In this review, we consider the 
evaluation of two forecasts in which: (i) the two forecasts are generated from two distinct 
econometric models; (ii) one forecast is generated from an econometric model and the other 
is obtained as a combination of a model and intuition; and (iii) the two forecasts are generated 
from two distinct (but unknown) combinations of different models and intuition. It is shown 
that alternative tools are needed to compare and evaluate the forecasts in each of these three 
situations. These alternative techniques are illustrated by comparing the forecasts from the 
(econometric) Staff of the Federal Reserve Board and the FOMC on inflation, unemployment 
and real GDP growth.  It is shown that the FOMC does not forecast significantly better than 
the Staff, and that the intuition of the FOMC does not add significantly in forecasting the 
actual values of the economic fundamentals. This would seem to belie the purported expertise 
of the FOMC. 
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1.  Introduction. 
Macroeconomic forecasts are frequently produced, widely published, intensively discussed 
and comprehensively used. The formal evaluation of such forecasts has a long research 
history. There are many studies on the design of appropriate evaluation criteria (see, for 
example, Chong and Hendry (1986), Granger and Newbold (1986), Elliott and Timmermann 
(2008), and various chapters in Clements and Hendry (2002)). There has also been 
considerable discussion about the proper use of data, as macroeconomic data are frequently 
revised over time. Thus, the important question arises as to which vintage of data is the most 
relevant. There is also a considerable literature on alternative combinations of forecasts. 
Indeed, it may well be that combined forecasts outperform individual forecasts (see 
Timmermann (2006) for a recent survey).  
The situation to be reviewed in this paper addresses a different aspect of 
macroeconomic forecasts, which may be presented as follows. The analyst has two (or more) 
forecasts and it is unknown how these forecasts were constructed. In order to keep the 
notation simple, we assume that each forecast is constructed as follows. The forecaster has 
access to an econometric model-based forecast (MF) and combines this with personal 
intuition (I), as follows: 
 IMFForecast     
For each forecaster, the values of MF,  , I and   are known. In what follows, we assume 
the structural stability of an econometric forecasting model. A second forecaster also has a 
way of arriving at a final forecast. The analyst does not know any of these values, having 
only the two forecasts
1
.  
                                                 
1
 In business forecasting, similar situations can occur when a statistical forecast can be adjusted by a manager. 
Due to the increased availability of relevant data, it is only recently that several studies have begun to focus on 
the behavior of managers when they receive these statistical forecasts. Indeed, in business forecasting, it is also 
acknowledged that analysts do need to know what it is that managers do before they can evaluate the quality of 
their adjusted forecasts. Recent studies are Fildes et al. (2009), Franses and Legerstee (2009), and Eroglu and 
Croxton (2010).  
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This paper is concerned with comparing the two resultant forecasts. Note that, when
0 , the final forecast is fully based on intuition. When 0 and 1 , the final forecast 
is based fully on an econometric model. This second case is the typical case studied in most 
econometrics textbooks.  
Forecasts of the above type are provided, for example, by the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF), delivering the mean of forecasts reported by various experts. Indeed, it is 
not likely that all their forecasts are based on econometric models. Recently, Franses et al. 
(2011) documented that all forecasts from the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (CPB) are the weighted sum of an econometric model forecast (based on a model 
comprising 2500 equations) and intuition.  In the same spirit, it is likely that forecasts 
reported by, among others, the IMF, World Bank and the OECD are almost certainly 
obtained in a similar way.  
In this concise review, we address the issue of evaluating macroeconomic forecasts 
when they might be based only partly on econometric models, in a way that is unknown to 
the analyst. The main focus of some recent developments in this area is that the analyst 
somehow has to disentangle the replicable from the non-replicable components of these 
forecasts, whereby the analyst can use a publicly available information set. This replicable 
part then mimics an econometric model that might have been used. The remainder of the 
forecasts, namely the non-replicable component, is associated with intuition, as it cannot be 
replicated by the analyst. As forecasters can and do incorporate the forecasts provided by 
other forecasters before presenting their own, the publicly available information set would 
typically also contain previously published forecasts. When formally comparing the forecasts, 
it is necessary to use alternative econometric tools as the variables of interest will turn out to 
be generated regressors, which contain estimation error.  
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we address three 
simple cases, which can naturally be extended in various directions. Consider two forecasts 
that might be generated from: (i) two distinct econometric models; (ii) an econometric model 
and a combination of model and intuition; and (iii) two distinct (but unknown) combinations 
of model and intuition. It is shown that, in each situation, alternative tools are needed to 
compare and evaluate the forecasts. In Section 3 we illustrate the alternative cases by 
comparing the forecasts from the Federal Reserve Board and the FOMC on inflation, 
unemployment and real GDP growth. It is shown that each of the three situations can lead to 
significantly different evaluation outcomes.  
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2. Model Specifications. 
This section reviews three different cases concerning two macroeconomic forecasts, wherein 
the analyst has to evaluate their relative quality and performance under different assumptions 
regarding the econometric model and intuition. 
. 
2.1 Forecasts from two econometric models. 
Consider the variable of interest, tX , and the availability of two sets of one-step-ahead 
forecasts, tF ,1 and tF ,2 , for the sample Nnnnt  ,...,2,1 . When the forecasts are based 
on linear econometric models, these models may be given as 
  ttt WX ,11,1          (1) 
  ttt WX ,22,2          (2) 
where the information sets for the two econometric models are given, respectively, as tW ,1  
and tW ,2 , each including a column of ones. When OLS is used to estimate the unknown 
parameters, the unbiased forecasts are given as 
  1,1,1 ˆtt WF          (3) 
  2,2,2 ˆtt WF          (4) 
In practice, it is quite likely that only the outcomes, tF ,1  and tF ,2 , are available to the analyst, 
but the information sets, tW ,1 and tW ,2 , are not made available. Let us assume that the analyst 
can resort to the publicly available information set, tW , which can include both tW ,1  and  tW ,2
..  
When it is known that tW ,1  nests tW ,2 , the techniques developed in Clark and 
McCracken (2001) are useful. If the models are non-nested, one can rely on, for example, the 
Diebold and Mariano (1995) test (see also West (1996)).  
An alternative simple method that might be used when little is known about tW ,1  and 
tW ,2  relies on the auxiliary regression: 
  tttt FFX   ,22,11       (5) 
This regression is also at the heart of combinations of forecasts (see Timmermann, 2006).  
Regression (5) can be used to examine whether each of the forecasts adds significantly to the 
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other forecast. If so, then one may want to combine the two forecasts, with the parameters in 
(5) being used as weights.  
 
2.2 One forecast from a model, the other from a combination of model and intuition. 
A second case is the following. Suppose that the second forecast tF ,2  is partly based on a 
model, but also partly based on the first forecast, tF ,1 , and on intuition, that is: 
  1,1,1 ˆtt WF          (6) 
  tttt FWF ,2,12,2,2
ˆ         (7) 
where t,2  denotes the intuition included in the second forecast. When 2,2 ˆtW  in (7) is the 
outcome of some econometric model, then that part of (7) is unbiased, but the two added 
terms, ttF ,1,1   , may cause bias. Evidence for the presence of bias in macroeconomic 
forecasts is presented in Batchelor (2007), among others.   
It is evident that now the regression 
tttt FFX   ,22,11       (8)  
cannot be used in a straightforward manner as the forecast tF ,2  contains tF ,1 . Franses et al. 
(2009) and Chang et al. (2011) propose the auxiliary regression 
  tttt FWF   ,1,2       (9) 
in order to estimate 
  tttt FFX   ,22,11
ˆ                 (10) 
where ttt FWF ,1,2 ˆ
ˆˆ    is obtained from (9).  
As tF ,2
ˆ  is a generated regressor, the econometric analysis of (10) is non-standard. 
When the difference between tF ,2
ˆ  and tF ,2  is viewed as a measurement error, the covariance 
matrix of t  in (10) is not proportional to the identity matrix, so that t  is serially correlated 
and heteroskedastic. However, as Franses et al. (2009) demonstrate, OLS estimation of the 
parameters in (10) can nevertheless be consistent and efficient. 
Franses et al. (2009) establish the conditions under which OLS estimation of the 
parameters in a more general version of (10) is efficient by appealing to Kruskal’s Theorem, 
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which is necessary and sufficient for OLS to be efficient (see McAleer and McKenzie (1991), 
Fiebig et al. (1992) and McAleer (1992) for further details). In the context of OLS estimation 
of (10), the necessary and sufficient conditions for OLS to be efficient will be satisfied either 
if the variables used to obtain the forecast tF ,1  are contained in the information set of the 
forecast tF ,2 , or are orthogonal to the variables in the information set of tF ,2 . Of the two 
alternative necessary and sufficient conditions, it is more likely that the former condition will 
hold.  
It was also shown in Franses et al. (2009) that, if the incorrect downward biased OLS 
standard errors are used, then the incorrect OLS t-ratios will be biased upward. Therefore, 
they suggest that the correct OLS covariance matrix in (10) should be estimated consistently 
using the Newey-West HAC standard errors (see also Smith and McAleer (1994)). Finally, 
Franses et al. (2009) and Chang et al. (2011) propose using GMM as an alternative to OLS. 
 
2.3 Both forecasts as distinct combinations of model and intuition. 
A third case, which may be the most likely to occur in practice, is where both forecasts are 
distinct combinations of model and intuition. To the analyst, the nature of this combination is 
unknown. It is also most likely that there is no documentation regarding any such intuition.  
Franses et al. (2011) document that, at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (CPB), detailed records are retained of the size of any changes, but not of the 
motivation for the size of any changes. Hence, one may presume that the analyst has forecasts 
that might be generated as follows: 
ttt WF ,11,1,1
ˆ                   (11) 
  tttt FWF ,2,12,2,2
ˆ                  (12) 
where t,1  and t,2 are intuition, and where we again assume that forecaster 2 has knowledge 
of the other forecast. If this is not the case, one can impose the restriction 0  in (12).   
In order to evaluate the relative merits of these two forecasts, one would then run the 
regressions: 
  ttt WF ,11,1                   (13) 
ttt WF ,22,2                   (14) 
First, as in case 2, one may consider the auxiliary regression: 
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  tttt FFX   ,22,11
ˆˆ                (15) 
where tF ,2
ˆ  and tF ,1
ˆ  are obtained from (13) and (14), respectively. Again, OLS is consistent, 
but HAC standard errors are required for valid inferences to be drawn.  
Second, one may also examine what the forecasts might add to what an analyst can do 
using publicly available information, and this would be based on the auxiliary regression: 
   ttttt WX   ,22,11 ˆˆ               (16) 
where t,1ˆ  and t,2ˆ  are the estimated residuals from (13) and (14), respectively. As tW  
denotes publicly available information, the regression in (16) informs whether the intuition 
(which is not observable, but rather is estimated) of forecaster 1 and/or of forecaster 2 adds 
any significant value to the final forecast. For example, if the estimate of 1  in (16) is 
significant, then one can conclude that the intuition of forecaster 1 adds to forecast accuracy 
of the forecast based solely on tW . 
 
3. Evaluating FOMC and Staff Forecasts. 
In this section we evaluate empirically the above three cases using data that were recently 
analyzed in Romer and Romer (2008). In their study, they compare Staff  and FOMC 
forecasts, and their starting point is case 1 in Section 2. In this section, we examine if a 
change in assumptions regarding how the forecasts were obtained, namely  cases 2 and 3, can 
materially change the conclusions reached in Romer and Romer (2008) regarding the 
superiority of Staff versus FOMC forecasts. 
The variables of interest, tX , in Romer and Romer (2008) are the (real time) inflation 
rate, unemployment rate, and the real growth rate. The data for the empirical analysis are 
described in Romer and Romer (2008, pp. 230-231), and are available in an appendix on the 
AEA website (http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issues_datasets.php). As discussed in Romer 
and Romer (2008, pp. 230-231), the FOMC prepares forecasts in February and July each 
year. The February forecasts for inflation and the growth rate are for the four quarters ending 
in the fourth quarter of the current year, and the unemployment rate forecast is for the fourth 
quarter of the current year. The July forecasts are for the same variables for both the current 
and next year. The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July 
forecasts, giving a total of 68 observations. 
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[Insert Figures 1-3 about here] 
 
The actual inflation rate, unemployment rate and real growth rate, as well as the 
corresponding staff and FOMC forecasts, are shown in Figures 1-3, respectively. It is clear 
that the staff and FOMC forecasts are very similar, but it is also clear that they are not 
particularly close to the actual rates they are forecasting, which raises the question as to how 
much better these forecasts are relative to those that an analyst could make based on publicly 
available information. The similarity in the two sets of forecasts is supported by the 
correlations in Table 1 between the staff and FOMC forecasts, which are obviously very 
close to each other. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The similarity in forecast performance is also shown in Table 2, which reports the mean and 
median squared prediction errors for the staff and FOMC forecasts for the three variables. 
The staff seems slightly better than the FOMC in forecasting the inflation rate, the reverse 
holds in forecasting the real growth rate, and it is too close to call for the unemployment rate, 
with the staff only slightly better (worse) than the FOMC in terms of the mean (median) 
squared prediction error. In terms of forecasting performance, therefore, it would be fair to 
call the outcome a tie. The Diebold-Mariano test supports this conclusion as the test does not 
indicate significant differences. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Case 1: Assume that Staff and FOMC forecasts are based purely on econometric models. 
Romer and Romer (2008) assume that Case 1 prevails in this situation, and they run the 
regression: 
tttt PSX   21                (17) 
where S denotes the Staff forecast and P denotes the Policymaker (that is, FOMC) forecasts. 
In terms of formal tests of the forecasting performance of the staff and the FOMC, the OLS 
and GMM estimates of equation (17) are given in Table 3. When Case 2 would be the real 
situation and Case 1 is assumed, then OLS is inconsistent and the forecast is not MSE 
optimal, while GMM is consistent. For the instrument list for GMM, we use the one-period 
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lagged values of inflation, unemployment rate and real growth rate (except for the case of real 
growth, where only the second lag is used for a better fit).  We experimented with alternative 
sets of instruments, but the qualitative results did not change significantly. We also examined 
recursive parameter estimates and recursive residuals, but we obtained no indication of 
structural breaks.   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
For each variable, the first line reports the OLS results (which could be inconsistent in case 
2), and the second line gives the GMM results. The OLS estimates correspond to those in 
Table 1 in Romer and Romer (2008), where it was inferred that the staff forecasts dominated 
those of the FOMC for inflation and the unemployment rate, though not for the real growth 
rate. It is instructive that the GMM estimates indicate that the staff is better than the FOMC in 
forecasting inflation, but not in forecasting the unemployment rate or the growth rate, where 
the effects of both the staff and FOMC forecasts are insignificant.  
Although the OLS and GMM estimates of the coefficients are markedly different, it is 
worth noting that the sums (with estimated standard errors in parentheses) of the estimated 
staff and FOMC marginal effects are very similar, namely 1.00 (0.39) and 1.13 (1.44) for 
inflation, 0.94 (0.38) and 1.01 (1.79) for the unemployment rate, and 0.88 (0.49) and 1.19 
(3.69) for the growth rate, which suggests that the estimates are economically meaningful. In 
this sense, the sum of the parts would seem to be greater than the whole. 
 
Case 2: Let the FOMC forecast be created after the Staff forecast is published, and assume 
that the Staff forecast is based on an econometric model. 
In this case we assume that (6) and (7) are useful, and are expressed as 
  1,1 ˆtt WS                   (18) 
  ptttt SWP   2,2
ˆ                (19) 
This says that the Staff use an unknown econometric model, while the FOMC has a model, 
but also relies on the Staff forecasts and unobserved intuition, pt . As analysts, we do not 
observe the information sets tW ,1  and tW ,2 , and we do not know 
p
t . Hence, we rely on an 
auxiliary regression, as in (9), in order to calculate tPˆ , which can be expressed as:  
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  tttt SWP                   (20) 
where, for tW , we include one-period lagged values of inflation, unemployment rate and real 
growth rate to be consistent with the situation in case 1.  
   
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The OLS estimates of equation (20), where (A) concerns the full model and (B) the case 
where 0 , are given in Table 4. For purposes of estimating (20) (A), OLS is efficient and 
the forecast is MSE optimal, but OLS is inconsistent and the forecast is not MSE optimal for 
estimating (20) (B).  
In the absence of additional variables other than the Staff forecasts, the inconsistent 
OLS estimates for (20) (B) might seem to suggest that the effect of the Staff forecast on the 
FOMC forecast is very close to unity for all three variables. However, the inclusion of 
additional variable available to the forecasters of the FOMC expertise, as approximated by 
one-period lagged inflation, unemployment and real growth rates, shows that the effect of the 
Staff forecast, while remaining significant, is considerably less. The F test of the joint 
significance of what FOMC adds to the Staff forecasts makes it clear it does matter, and 
significantly so, in obtaining the forecast P . In short, the FOMC uses information that is 
statistically significant. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The empirical performance of the Staff and FOMC forecasts (after de-biasing) are compared 
in Table 5. The auxiliary regression is 
tttt PSX  
ˆ
21                (21) 
where tPˆ  is obtained from (20). Although OLS is efficient and the forecast is MSE optimal 
for equation (21), the standard errors are not proportional to the identity matrix, so the 
Newey-West HAC standard errors are calculated. The Staff is seen to dominate the FOMC 
for the inflation rate, but both the Staff and FOMC forecasts are insignificant for the 
unemployment and real growth rates. Although the goodness of fit of the OLS estimates in 
Tables 3 and 5 are virtually identical, the corresponding coefficient estimates are markedly 
different. However, the sums of the estimated staff and FOMC marginal effects in Table 5 are 
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very similar to their OLS counterparts in Table 3, at 1.01 (0.55), 0.95 (0.71) and 0.98 (1.17) 
for inflation, unemployment rate and real growth rate, respectively, which suggest that the 
estimates are economically meaningful. 
In summary, in a comparison with the Staff forecasts, the use of FOMC forecasts, as 
in Cases 1 or 2, yield considerably different empirical results. It can be seen clearly that the 
FOMC does not forecast well, but the same can be said about the Staff! 
 
Case 3: Assume that both forecasts are based on distinct combinations of model and 
intuition. 
In this situation, which seems most likely to hold in practice, we assume that (11) and (12) 
hold, which means that we run the auxiliary regressions: 
  ttt WS ,11                   (22) 
tttt SWP ,2                  (23) 
Next, we consider the auxiliary regression: 
tttt PSX  
ˆˆ
21                (24) 
where tSˆ  and tPˆ  are obtained as the fitted values from (22) and (23), respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In Table 6, we report the OLS estimates of the parameters in (24), with the HAC standard 
errors. The evidence from this table demonstrates clearly that the Staff forecasts outperform 
the FOMC forecasts for all three variables, as the staff forecasts are significant whereas the 
FOMC forecasts are not. 
The final situation that is of interest is to see whether the Staff and FOMC forecasts 
contain any unobservable intuition that might significantly add to what an analyst could 
achieve using publicly available information. We consider 
ttttt WX   ,22,11 ˆˆ               (25) 
and report the estimates in Table 7, where it is found that the Staff intuition is significant for 
all three variables, whereas the FOMC intuition is not. 
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
These results are consistent with the findings in Table 6, namely that the intuition contained 
in the FOMC forecasts does not add significantly, whereas the intuition contained in the Staff 
forecasts does add significantly, in forecasting actual values of all three economic 
fundamentals. These results regarding intuition would seem to belie the purported expertise 
of the FOMC. 
 
4. Conclusion. 
The purpose of the paper was to provide a concise review of the evaluation of 
macroeconomic forecasts using alternative combinations of econometric model and intuition, 
which is the non-replicable component of forecasts. 
In the empirical illustration, which was concerned with a comparison of the forecasts 
provided by the Federal Reserve Board’s Staff and the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC), it could safely be concluded that the FOMC did not add significantly to the 
forecasts of  inflation, unemployment rate and the real growth rate, in comparison with the 
Staff. 
Moreover, when we regressed the inflation rate, unemployment rate and the real 
growth rate on one-period lags of these three variables, we obtained mean squared prediction 
errors of 0.64, 0.25, and 1.31 respectively, while the median squared prediction errors are 
0.03, 0.07 and 0.23. Hence, the analyst with simple forecasting tools could outperform both 
the Staff and the FOMC. 
Table 7 suggested that the analyst could benefit from the intuition contained in the 
Staff forecasts, but not from the intuition in the FOMC forecasts, which would seem to belie 
the purported expertise of the FOMC. 
This review concerned the situation that seems to prevail in practice. It is rarely found 
that macroeconomic forecasts are based on model outcomes only. When evaluating these 
forecasts, one can then not rely entirely on standard tools, as the added intuition may render 
the final forecasts biased. We evaluated some recent developments in this relatively new area, 
but it can safely be said that there are further developments to come.  
Further work in this area may refer to the recent literature on forecasting inflation and 
other macroeconomic variables using model that allow parameters to change over time (see, 
for example, Stock and Watson (2003)). Furthermore, in our empirical analysis we only used 
three instruments, which were conveniently available at the same sampling frequency as the 
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data of interest. In other settings, one could have forecasts created at the monthly level, and 
then would not necessarily have to rely on a few specific instruments. Indeed, one could then 
use multivariate techniques, such as principal components, to summarize a wealth of 
variables (see, for example, Heij et al. (2011) and the citations given therein). These 
techniques would prevent us from having to make specific choices for the inclusion of 
instruments as all available variables can be included automatically.  Finally, one can 
elaborate on the small sample properties of the methods proposed in this paper, and one may 
also allow for time-varying parameters in order to allow for potential structural breaks in the 
data or in the model parameters.   
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Table 1 
 
Correlations between Staff Forecasts and FOMC Forecasts 
 
 
   Variable         Correlation 
 
 
   Inflation    0.99 
     
   Unemployment   0.99 
 
   Real growth    0.97 
 
 
Note: The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July forecasts, 
giving a total of 68 observations.  
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Comparison of Staff Forecasts and FOMC Forecasts 
 
 
                                                                 Squared Prediction Errors 
 
     Mean    Median 
    __________________ __________________ 
 Variable  Staff  FOMC  Staff  FOMC  
 
 
 Inflation  0.71  0.89  0.19  0.28  
   
 Unemployment 0.54  0.57  0.16  0.15   
 
 Real growth  2.10  1.99  1.22  1.04   
 
 
 Note: The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July forecasts, 
giving a total of 68 observations.  
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Table 3 (Case 1) 
 
Comparison of Staff and FOMC Forecasts in Predicting Actual Values 
(standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
 
Estimation method Intercept       Staff (St)         FOMC (Pt)   R
2 
 
 
Inflation 
 
OLS   -0.20   1.10
**   
-0.10   0.86 
   (0.22)   (0.39)  (0.37) 
 
GMM   -0.26   4.77
**  
-3.64   0.64
  
   (0.34)   (2.32)  (2.26) 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
OLS    0.26    0.97
*  
-0.03   0.79 
   (0.41)   (0.38)  (0.40) 
 
GMM   -0.37   3.41
  
-2.40   0.64
  
   (0.76)   (2.78)  (2.87) 
 
 
Real growth 
 
OLS    0.43    0.25
    
0.63   0.44 
   (0.36)   (0.49)  (0.52) 
 
GMM   -0.22    1.70
  
-0.51   0.31
  
   (0.83)   (3.61)  (3.42) 
 
 
Notes: The regression model is  
 tttt PSX   21 , 
which is equation (1) in Romer and Romer (2008)), and equation (17) in the paper.  The OLS 
estimates correspond to those in Table 1 of Romer and Romer (2008). The instrument list 
uses the one-period lagged values of inflation, unemployment rate and real growth (except for 
the case of real growth, where only lag 2 is used). 
*
 and 
**
 denote significance at the 5% and 
1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4 (Case 2) 
 
Auxiliary regressions to de-bias the FOMC forecasts 
(standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
 
   Inflation  Unemployment Real growth 
   ________  ____________ __________ 
 
Variables  (A) (B)  (A) (B)  (A) (B) 
 
 
Intercept  -0.18 0.01  -0.00 0.19  -0.22 0.28 
   (0.16) (0.07)  (0.13) (0.12)  (0.20) (0.08) 
 
Staff Forecast, St  0.91
** 
1.03
**  
0.77
** 
0.96
**  
0.86
** 
0.93
** 
   (0.06) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.03) 
  
Pt-1   0.38
**
   0.32
**   
0.33
** 
   (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.12) 
 
St-1   -0.26
*   
-0.14   -0.19 
   (0.13)   (0.12)   (0.11) 
 
Inflationt-1  -0.03   -0.00   0.02
 
   (0.04)   (0.02)   (0.03) 
 
Unemploymentt-1 0.04   0.04   0.03 
   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.03) 
   
Real growtht-1  0.01   0.01   0.02 
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03) 
 
  
R
2 
  0.99 0.98  0.98 0.98  0.96 0.94 
 
F test    4.86
** 
  5.79
**   
5.87
**  
  
 
Notes: The regression equation correlates Pt and St through 
 tttt SWP    
which is equation (20) in the paper. 
*
 and 
**
 denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5 (Case 2) 
 
Comparison of Staff and FOMC Forecasts in Predicting Actual Values: Staff forecasts 
are based on an econometric model, and FOMC forecasts are based on Staff forecasts, 
other variables and intuition (standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
 
Estimation method Intercept        Staff (St)          FOMC (Pt)   R
2 
 
 
Inflation 
 
OLS   -0.20   1.89
**  
-0.88   0.85 
(HAC)   (0.25)   (0.55)  (0.56) 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
OLS    0.22    0.80
    
0.15   0.79 
(HAC)   (0.67)   (0.71)  (0.71)
 
 
 
Real growth 
 
OLS    0.10   -0.28
    
1.26   0.45 
(HAC)   (0.48)   (1.07)   (1.06)
 
 
 
 
Notes: The regression model is  
 tttt PSaX  
ˆ
0 , 
which is equation (21) in the paper. The Newey-West HAC standard errors are given in 
parentheses. 
**
 denotes significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 6  
 
Comparison of Staff and FOMC Forecasts in Predicting Actual Values: Staff forecasts 
are based on an econometric model and intuition, and FOMC forecasts are based on 
Staff forecasts, other variables and intuition (HAC standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
 
Estimation method Intercept        Staff (St)          FOMC (Pt)   R
2 
 
 
Inflation 
 
OLS   -0.34   0.58
*  
0.43   0.85 
(HAC)   (0.29)   (0.27)  (0.23) 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
OLS   -0.13   0.80
**   
0.20   0.82 
(HAC)   (0.67)   (0.20)  (0.14) 
 
 
Real growth 
 
OLS   -0.95   1.16
**  
0.30   0.62 
(HAC)   (0.56)   (0.18)  (0.21) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The regression model is  
 tttt PSX  
ˆˆ
21 , 
which is equation (24) in the paper. The Newey-West HAC standard errors are given in 
parentheses. 
*,**
 denotes significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively..  
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Table 7 
 
Comparison of Staff and FOMC Forecasts in Predicting Actual Values: Intuition is 
added to the lagged variables (chosen by the analyst) (parameter estimates for lagged 
inflation, lagged unemployment and lagged growth are not reported) (HAC standard 
errors are in parentheses) 
 
 
           Intuition of  
Estimation method          Staff (St)        FOMC (Pt)   R
2 
 
 
Inflation 
 
OLS     0.58
*  
0.25   0.87 
(HAC)     (0.24)  (0.48) 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
OLS     0.32
**  
-0.19   0.90 
(HAC)     (0.10)  (0.40) 
 
 
Real growth 
 
OLS     0.29
*  
0.45   0.65 
(HAC)     (0.15)  (0.62) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The regression model is  
 ttttt WX   ,22,11 ˆˆ , 
which is equation (25) in the paper. The Newey-West HAC standard errors are given in 
parentheses. 
*,**
 denotes significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
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Figure 1 
 
Inflation rate, Staff forecasts (S_inflation) and FOMC forecasts (P_inflation) 
 
The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July forecasts 
(1979 is observation 1 and 2001 is observation 68). 
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Figure 2 
 
Unemployment rate, Staff forecasts (S_unemp) and FOMC forecasts (P_unemp) 
 
The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July forecasts 
(1979 is observation 1 and 2001 is observation 68). 
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Figure 3 
 
Growth rate, Staff forecasts (S_growth) and FOMC forecasts (P_growth) 
 
The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July 
forecasts (1979 is observation 1 and 2001 is observation 68). 
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